After the last sky...

A right to self determination?... no thanks

2008-01-26T01:00:00.000+01:00

"No greater monument to human stupidity and ignorance can be conceived than the frequent and blithe espousal of ethnic nationalism today."

Michael Neumann, in The Case Against Israel. Counterpunch, California, USA. 2005, p. 17.

It is not the notion of Palestinian (or any kind) of national identity that I object to. Nor do I suggest that those behind the 'self determination' rhetoric have, for the most part, have noble and decent anti-imperial intentions - for which I certainly have sympathy for (although the question of what Wilson's true intentions were remains a moot point that we do not go into now).

I simply think that the idea of a communal right to self determination makes logical nonsense, and the way it is banded about in the ill defined way that it is does an active disservice to the Palestinian national cause.

This conclusion is base on three main criticisms of 'self determination' and it must be credited to Prof. Michael Neumann. First, and foremost, that the right to self determination is a term that is easily applicable to no only the best but also the very worst reasons for engaging in conflict. Second, that the right is not universally applicable (and considering the first point a jolly good thing too!). Third, that experience tells us that the 'right' is simply impractical.

First "the 'self determination of peoples' has a sinister undertone. It amounts to advocating the assignment of territory and political power according to ethnicity." If I were to advocate the right to self determination to the nation of English people, would you really believe for a second that I wasn't talking about white, Christian Daily Mail readers? Ethnic-nationalism has an uncomfortably close relationship to racial nationalism... and even we can pick the odd example of a genuinely pluralist Ethno-nationalist movement, it is not hard to find ten, or a hundred of examples of a racial exclusivist agenda is pursued. Don't I get a right to self determination for my kin - just because they are white and comparatively rich? how about Afrikaanas? or Tutsis? - and come to think of it, wasn't Zionism framed as a legitimate pursuit of 'self determination' as Jews escaped the various phases of horrific instigations of ethno-nationalist agendas in this continent's bloody history?

Second, the right is clearly not universally applicable, because - unlike individual human rights, a group's 'right to self determination' depends on the capacity,and willingness, of external parities to recognises the group as one worthy of a right. In essence, it depends on others to both recognise the right, but also the right to a right! I am sure you can see the problems here. If I argue for a 'right to self determination' for all people named Phil, or all people who prefer cricket to football - then my arguments are plainly silly. We need therefore a body to discern between 'real' rights and 'silly' ones. Wilson had such a body in mind when he came up with the fourteen points... I don't think we need to go intothe details of The League of Nation's particularly chequered history on this matter or even to it's successor's, we can simply summise that even in the rare cases that the UN has regonised a people's claim to such a right (not that it has done even this for say... the Tamils, or effectively for the Kurds) - it is frequently held to ransom by the countries in the UN where the majority of money and equipment come from (UNSCR 198 and 242 spring to mind). One might suggest this is only because of injustice in the global system, well, yes - I'd agree with that, but thats basically how the global system is, and how its always been - and frankly, if we had a 'just' global system, would we even be having a discussion about 'self determination' in the first place? The long and short of it is that 'self determination' not only gets it wrong in this respect, but it does way worse - it gives the authority to decide where it is applicable to those who are most powerful in the global system in other words - those who are naturally most inclined to reject change!

Third, the impracticality of the 'right'. I've already mentioned some examples above and the particularly unpleasant or even absurd consequences in several cases, and also the myriad of cases where it simply hasn't gotten off the ground. However, it is Neumann's example that really encapsulates the silliness of the idea. "The state of Yogosalvia was proclaimed by the Yoguslav national council. The Western powers recognized this product of self determination and for many years it seemed that there was a Yoguslav people. Today the use of such a phrase would be a good but rather bitter joke."

My final, parting silo, is that basically, even if one existed, Palestine DOESN'T NEED a right to self determination. The case is only more muddied by the use of such language that is so easily adapted for its own purposes by the other side! How many times have I read that Zionism is the manifestation of self determination, getting into that old basket case argument of a biblical right to a particular piece of land. Or even the arguments (that you cite yourself) attacking the Palestinian 'right to self determination' because there was no cogent notion of Palestinian nationalism before X or Y year. Who cares? These are tactics that are used to make the issue appear far more complicated than it is!

The Palestinian case should be based on individual human rights that are unquestionably the basis of international law and are based on such widely acknowledged experiancial basis that even Prof. Dershowitz would struggle to find fault with.

Palestinians have a right to life, liberty and security of person... because everybody does according to Article 3 of the UN Declaration of 1948.

Palestinians have a right to due process of law and protection from involuntary servitude and cruel and inhuman treatment... because everybody does (articles 4,5 and 6)

Palestinians have a right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country... because I do, and you do and everybody does (article 13).

Palestinians have a right to nationality (!) and education (my personal favorite) freedom of peaceful assembly and association (articles 15, 20 and 26) because we all do... and the list goes on... and on... and on... (and long may it continue!)

I highly recommend Neumann's book, and also his website: http://members.tripod.com/mneumann/mnisrael.htm

Three quarters of the people who talk on television about the Islamic world, couldn’t find their way out of a bag in the Islamic world!

2007-12-17T00:18:00.000+01:00

This is a short extract from a lecture given at Stanford University entitled: “Democracy and the Middle East: Prospects and Problems”. The lecture took place on Thursday, April 20, 2006 at 7:30-9:00 pm, and was part of Stanford’s “Aurora Forum” and open to the general public.

The extract covers a question regarding the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the answer given by Abbas Milani.

Abbas Milani is a research fellow and co-director of the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution with an appointment in Stanford’s Department of Political Science, Abbas Milani is the author of Tales of Two Cities: A Persian Memoir (1996), Modernity and Its Foes in Iran (1998); and Lost Wisdom: Rethinking Modernity in Iran (2004).

Questioner:

“To what extent does Islam play a role in this? Much of the popular discourse focuses on the inherent inconsistency between Islam and democracy. Arab countries are always cited as ‘exhibit A’ [wherein the inconsistency is deemed to be most apparent]. Arab counties constitute 15% of the world’s Muslim population, and by my ‘back or the envelope calculation’ the countries of Turkey, India, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Malaysia, make up nearly half of the world’s Muslim population. So I’d like you to reflect a little bit on: to what extent is Islam a causal factor in the anti-democratic nature of governance in Arab countries. And I’d like to turn Bernard Lewis’* question on its head ‘What’s wrong with Islam?’ and I’d like to ask you: what’s wrong with the way we may be thinking about Islam and its role in democratic development?”

*Bernard Lewis is the Cleveland E. Dodge Professor Emeritus of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University and specializes in the history of Islam and the interaction between Islam and the West. He is also an advisor to the Bush Administration and to often also to other members of the Republican Party.

Abbas Milani:

“First of all, I think one of the great misperceptions that exist in the west about Islam, is that there is a monolith out there called ‘Islam’. We have as many varieties of Islam as there are varieties of Judaism, Christianity and Buddhism. There are stridently fundamentalist, pseudo-fascist, Islamists, and there are democratic Islamists who want to live as much in a democracy as anyone, anywhere. That Islam has a unified-anti-democratic history is also, I think, a great miss-conception. When the West had never heard of ‘multiculturalism’, Islam had a multicultural empire. And Jews, according to the same Bernard Lewis, when they were being thrown out of Spain, and they were being thrown out of England* … the safest place for Jews, was the Muslim world, and this according to Bernard Lewis … and we had, a thousand years ago in Baghdad, a set up where Muslims, Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians would have open philosophical discussions about the different merits of religion. Yet at the same time, during that same period, there were clerics who ordered the death of anyone who didn’t think like them. So, we don’t have ‘one Islam’, we have varieties of Islam, some of them very open to change, some of them very open to democracy, some of them completely opposed to democracy.

“Part of the problem, I think, in the way the West approaches it – and this is particularly true in America, I am sorry to say – America has an attitude that the Islamic world is ‘easy to understand’ and that anybody can be an ‘expert’ on the Islamic world. Three quarters of the people who talk on television about the Islamic world, couldn’t find their way out of a bag in the Islamic world! They don’t speak a word of Arabic, or Turkish, or Persian. They’ve never lived in that area! I know people who have written books about Iran, a whole book, describing 25,000 years of history, and the lady who wrote it wouldn’t know Persian from Turkish! She wouldn’t know the Turkish alphabet from the Persian alphabet.

“Think about this: in the last 25 year when the United States knew that the ‘Muslim phenomenon’ was going to be a problem the number of study centres in America had diminished (!) except for after September 11^th. The State Department did not teach Persian until after September 11^th – they had a handful of people speaking Arabic! When Ronald Regan was looking for the moderates in Iran, and brought a group of Iranians to the White House, they had to bring an Iranian business man to translate the discussion. The CIA didn’t have one person who could understand Persian.”

* These pogroms occurred in England at roughly the time of the signing of the Magna Carter in 1215, which is considered to be the foundation of ‘Civil liberties’ and habeas corpus, for all common law nations and states, including the United States, Australia and Canada, and for all international Human Rights legislation

MA results and thanks!

2007-10-27T16:14:00.000+01:00

The original purpose of my to the West Bank was to learn about Palestine in order to write my dissertation for my Masters degree in Peace Studies at Lancaster University's Department of Politics and International Relations. The marks for the masters degrees are being sent to us next weekend and then I'll find out how I've done. Regardless of whatever result I get I think its appropriate to use this opportunity to thank everyone who made my time in Palestine possible and for everyone who helped me by providing information and hospitality. What I've gotten out of this process has been worth more than any qualification ever could be. The strongest of friendships have been forged and I am grateful for every single one of them.

What I have learned, in some small way, is the perspective of a landless nation and an occupied people in perhaps the world's most infamous conflict. Some of what I saw was frightening, some of it filled me anger and some, like the constant non-violent resistance at Bili'n is simple awe inspiring. I will continue to do what ever I can to rouse people's attention in my own country and hopefully, where ever else I end up.

Obviously it would be unwise for me to copy any of the actual content of my dissertation up on the Internet, however I think it would be nice just to show the Abstact and Acknowledgments from the preamble, and to say again no matter how it turns out... THANK YOU!

Youth and the Palestinian
Resistance in the West Bank

by Philip Leech
(candidate for MA in Peace Studies, Lancaster University,UK, 2007.)

Abstract

This dissertation presents the argument that youth involvement in resistance in the West Bank is complex and multi-faceted yet is predominantly non-violent. It has been based predominantly on primary research in the form of interviews and other data I gathered during a two month research trip in the West Bank in 2007. From the structuralist school of conflict theory we discuss the way in which the material and ideational conditions affect not only how young Palestinians resist the occupation by also why. The concepts of ‘rational choice’ (Simon: 1955) and structural conflict theory (Galtung: 1996) are applied a detailed empirical discussion
on the nature of the occupation, its affects on young Palestinians and the most prevalent forms of resistance. The analysis of youth participation in resistance is then presented through the frameworks of different conceptual narratives (Khalili: 2007) and with reference to the various ways in which the affects of the occupation are opposed or overcome by young Palestinians. The dissertation concludes by confirming the validity of the structuralist argument and accounting for the predominance of non-violence as resistance in the West Bank.

Acknowledgements

My greatest debt of gratitude for this dissertation is to the every Palestinian, young and old, who were kind enough to assist me in my research by sitting for interviews, guiding me round cities, translating discussions, offering me advice, introducing me to the rich culture of the West Bank and most of all, for being so friendly and making me feel extraordinarily welcome.

I would also like to express enormous thanks to Ms. Sophie Richter-Devroe (Exeter University) for her suggestion of visiting the West Bank, her Arabic lessons and her exceptional guidance, and to Mr. and Mrs. Oliver Leech who have been wonderfully supportive in all kinds of different ways (not least, by worrying about me while I was in the West Bank and not telling me too often!).

My Thanks Also to:

Ms. Emily McNeill (Ithaca University)
Prof. Gerd Nonneman (Exeter University)
Ms. Laura Ribeiro (Right to Education Campaign, Birzeit University, Palestine)
Ms. Anita Sivakumaran (Lancaster University)
Ms. Catherine Leech
Dr. Amaledu Misra (Lancaster University)
Prof. Chris May (Lancaster University)
Mr. Aidin Fathalizadeh (University of California, Berkeley)
Ms. Aya Lowe (University of Edinburgh)
Dr. Muna Giacaman (Birzeit University, PAS Programme)
Ms. Hanadi Abu-Taha (Birzeit University, PAS Programme)
Mr. Kareem Rabie (The City University of New York, Graduate Center)
Ms. Nadine Kreitmeyr (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Instiute)
Mr. Christopher Ferris Zabaneh (University of Queens, Canada)
Mr. Thomas Marring
Ms. Angelique Thomas (Reed University)
Ms. Stephanie Nolen (The Globe and Mail, Canada)
Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi (Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs)
Ms. Joanna Beituni (Saint Xavier University)
Ms. Rima Manasra (Exeter University)

In accordance with my general policy of anatomy for Palestinian sources, I would like to
acknowledge the generous help given to me by the following people, without listing their
names:

Particular thanks to the head of volunteers for the PAS Programme at Birzeit University and to my guides in Hebron,
The Department for Education, Tulkarem District,
The Teachers Union, Tulkarem,

The Staff of:
The Olive Cooperative (Manchester, UK),
The PAS Programme (Birzeit University),
Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, (East Jerusalem),
Right to Education Campaign (Birzeit University),
Department for Politics and International Relations (Lancaster University),
Al-Haq Centre for Human Rights (East Jerusalem),
The Health Works Committee (West Bank),
Ibda Cultural Centre (Dheisheh Camp),
The Freedom Theatre (Jenin Camp),
The Community Centre (Jalazone Camp).

Second Open Letter to Paul Farrelly MP

2007-10-16T20:58:00.000+01:00

Dear Paul Farrelly MP,

Thank you for your prompt reply. I was very pleased to learn of your support for the Prime Minister’s initiative. Indeed I am also encouraged by the European Union’s call for the Government of Israel to reconsider the designation of Gaza as an “enemy entity”. It is apparent
from the lessons of Northern Ireland, and from James Wolfensohn’s recommendations for an effective long term strategy that economic growth is likely to be central to achieving a lasting peace. At a conference I attended in Jerusalem recently, former Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben Ami explained that such a strategy simply cannot be effective while Palestine is divided and while the international community ostensibly supports free elections and then objects to their
result.
I wonder, therefore, whether you consider that the European support for the international blockade that still victimises the innocent Palestinians in Gaza (and gives those with militant leanings another reason to see no distinction between Israel and its western allies), and the attempted isolation of Hamas (presumably including, but not limited to the Izz al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades) is one of the ‘short-term reactions’ or ‘over-reactions’ that, as you say, puts the
peace process at risk.
In my view the presentation of the Palestinian question has become set in a narrative which is more representative of a particular political agenda than actual fact. An important example ins ‘terrorism’ which according to international law and Richard Falk (Professor Emeritus at Princeton University and formerly a member of the UN Human Rights Inquiry Commission for the Palestinian Territories) is considered to be: violence “directed at civilians with a calculated
intention of producing fear as well as physical harm”. It is therefore distinguished from other forms of armed operations by its victims not by its perpetrators. As Falk explains in his paper Azmi Bishara, the Right of Resistance, and the Palestinian Ordeal: “Collective punishment
of a people subject to the exigencies of a military occupation with territorial ambitions is clearly as much a form of terrorism as reliance on suicide bombers.”
According to Falk the armed resistance that targets military assets of a hostile occupying power is not clearly permissible nor non-permissible. However, similar actions are applauded as a kind of national mythology in the United States (as the resistance to British rule), in Europe (the Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur and/or Maquis) and in Israel itself as armed resistance to British occupation in the late 1940s.
I believe that it would be extremely important, and supportive to the peace process, for the British Government to take the step of explicitly defining what it considers to be terrorism and ‘short-term reactions, and over-reactions’ in this context. The government of Israel currently undertakes routine torture, extra-judicial executions, house demolitions, pervasive methods of restricting movement, and illegal annexation of territory. (If you require, I can present you
with an in-depth academic report I have researched and written supplying a great deal of evidence supported by predominantly Israeli and international sources, such as B’tselem, ICAHD and my own interviews). Surely, if we are to be consistence under the law we must
demand the same of Israelis as we do of Palestinians.
Attacks which target civilians in Tel Aviv, the Negev or West Jerusalem are certainly morally wrong and the UK is right to demand their end. But there should be no special status for terrorism that is enacted by states. Therefore the British government must identify and
pursue the goal of ending terrorism against Palestinians with the same vigour it seeks to end terrorism by Palestinians.
I hope that with the opportunity of the Labour Party Conference and the commencement of a new parliament in the coming weeks you will actively encourage the government to take two actions. First, publicly state a clear position that distinguishes between what actions it
considers to be legitimate and illegitimate in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and applicable to both nations. Second, accept either the ending of the economic blockade against the Gaza Strip or its extension to the State of Israel until such time as the Israeli Government commits to the cessation of terrorism against the Palestinian people.
Finally, I would also like to ask if you would mind me quoting or summarizing your correspondence to me on my online blog (C.f. http://peechyinpalestine.blogspot.com).

Thank you for your continued correspondence,
Yours sincerely,

Phil Leech

Response from Mr. Paul Farrelly MP (Constituency of Newcastle-under-Lyme, Labour)

2007-10-16T20:43:00.000+01:00

You have to love getting letters back from Parliament... They come in a nice pale yellow envelope, on nice pale yellow paper emblazoned with "On Her Majesties Service" and in green the crest of the Palace of Westminster and "House of Commons" inside.

Paul Farrelly, by all accounts a very decent man, is my MP, and although we cirtainly differ in view on a wide range of issues (primarily on what he deems necessary for National Security and his support of certain recent foreign adventures by the British Expeditionary Force), I am pleased to report that he wrote back promptly and offered an interesting retort to my argument.

Dear Mr. Leech

Thank you for you thoughtful and passionate e-mail regarding the Palestinian Crisis and I appreciate and share your concerns.

Solving the Palestinian issue must be one of the international community's primary concerns.

To this end, I was present at an event recently where Gordon Brown was making a speech to leading figures in the Jewish commuinty in Britain. In his address he stressed that economic development was crucial for the Palestinians and that peace and prosperity went hand in hand. It was good to the Prime Minister taking such a balanced and thoughtful approach.

Unfortunately, however, such long-term strategies for peace in the Middle East are thwarted by short-term reactions, and over-reactions, and only by creating a stable environment can economic development occur.

Clearly, I will continue to support any campaign that attempts to solve the crisis and encorage further dialogue between all sides and I firmly believe that only through concerted international pressure will there be any resolution.

Best Wishes and Kind regards

Open letter to my MP

2007-09-19T21:24:00.000+01:00

I am writing to you to express concern regarding Britain's stance on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Today's decision by the Israeli government to designate the Gaza Strip as a 'hostile entity' and the support for this designation from the US Secretary of State, is a step very much in the wrong direction. I hope that as my representative to Parliament you will step up and do what is right.

In Palestine as a whole the Israeli occupation attacks/prevents/undermines normal life for everyone, all the time (I have seen this in the West Bank with my own eyes). I Gaza the situation is worse than the West Bank. According to Jeff Halper (Israeli Citizen and founder of the Israeli Campaign Against House Demolition: ICAHD) "The very legal framework invoked by Israel to carry out this illegal and immoral act – declaring Gaza a “hostile entity” within a “conflict short of war” – has absolutely no standing in international law. The collective punishment of an entire civilian population, by contrast, is explicitly prohibited."

The UK has for to long now fallen into line behind the US and Israel on this topic. It is surely time to learn from actually research of what is going on, on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza and coming to our own conclusion promoting a peaceful and just resolution to this conflict which is in everyone's best interest. Please use your position of authority to speak out against this absurd policy, and in support of international law.

Yours sincerely,

Phil Leech

A letter on Gabriel Schoenfeld's "The Return of Anti-Sematism"

2007-09-18T10:53:00.001+01:00

The book is available online at Amazon

Schoenfeld, G. (2004). The Return of Anti-semitism, Encounter Books. (http://www.politicospublishing.co.uk/titles.php/itemcode/125)

Thank you very much for the book! I read it over the past couple of days. It seems to be an interesting argument. Unfortunately its quite clear to me that the author is far more interested in promoting his own political agenda than presenting an extremely important issue in its true light.

Please excuse my pomposity in saying that: authors, and books, like this are guilty of many sins against the academy but the most important one is that they have a tenancy to paint over with a roller that which requires the finest brush and the most delicate touch (Fukuyama, Huntington and Kaplan are also famous names who similarly inclined to do this).

Schoenfel fails to define the term 'Anti-Semitism' anywhere in his book, although he implies throughout that any and all criticisms of Israel, Jews and Jewish society (particularly pro-Israel lobby groups in the US) are anti-Semitic. This raises two significant problems.

First it means that proper and accurate analysis of this phenomenon is hindered by the lack of clarity in discussion. Just as there is an obvious and fair distinction to be made between legitimate criticism of British or American culture and policy and racism, there must also be a distinction between legitimate criticism of Israeli policy and the actions of AIPAC (and the like) and Anti-Semitism. It is not Mr. Schoenfel's (or anyone else's for that matter) right to deny that Israel, AIPAC or any other organization or individual should be accountable for their actions just because they happen to be Jewish (or from any other cultural background for that matter).

The Second problem is that Schoenfel's analysis of the Israeli-Palestine conflict is obviously confused and very vague. He talks about 'Muslim anti-Semitism' starting in Malaysia and ending in Palestine without even stopping to draw breath. He argues that the manner of killing etc. that are performed by armed organizations in Palestine are reminiscent of the Nazis killing of European Jews. He also refers to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as 'Governance'. All three of these claims are obviously absurd.

Not once in my time in the OPTs did anyone compare Palestine to Malaysia. in fact I have never heard of such a comparison before reading Schoenfel's book. This is probably for a good reason. Malaysia and Palestine have hardly anything in common. Indeed, none of the comparisons nor conflations that Schoenfel seeks to make i.e. that all Arabs are the same or that all Muslims are the same, should really be taken very seriously. The reasons for this are obvious: for Palestinians Islam and Arab nationalism might well be important underlying concerns. But the overriding concern that affects people every single day of their lives is that their land is under military occupation by a foreign army. Anti-Semitism in Malaysia may well be rife, and it might be an important underlying factor in the 'Arab world' and it might be linked to Islam. I can't tell you, because I am not an expert in either Malaysian politics or Islamic doctrine. But even if it is (and even if they are...) to confuse these trends which are a world apart from life in the OPTs, and Palestinian resistance is frankly just silly and Schoenfel should know better.

The idea that there is a comparison between the armed resistance and the Holocaust is also a problem in the author's account. It is worthy of note that the author's claim is based on the way in which murderers laughed after killing an IDF trooper is apparently similar to the way in which Nazi's laughed while killing Jews. There is no comparison that is possible between these two. Nazi's sought to slaughter Jews purely on racial grounds. They wanted to kill as many as possible; they were a superior military force fighting an internal minority civilian population and they did so across Europe. Palestinian armed resistance is one element of a wide ranging resistance movement by a stateless people against an occupying military force (the 4^th largest in the world), where this armed resistance takes the form of terrorism (the attack on civilians) then it deserves to be condemned of course. Attacking military units, however, is something else.

The 4^th of July celebrates the military defeat of British forces bases in what was to become the United Stated of America. Many of us in Europe celebrate the resistance of French resistance in Germany and Israeli's themselves celebrate that armed resistance in mid 1940s that eventually lead the withdrawal of British troops, … Palestinian military resistance against the armed forces of a foreign power occupying their land is no less legitimate than these examples from history.

With reference to the occupation as 'governance', well this is frankly the most obvious method of manipulating the facts of all. The occupation (as you will see from my dissertation) is an all-pervasive very obvious military infrastructure that attacks/prevents/undermines Palestinian life on every level. It is this which is the very of the basis for legitimate criticisms of Israel. Beyond Israeli intervention and occupation of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine everything else may well be anti-Semitism. Of reactions to this, and hatred because of these specific acts of military oppression and ignorance of basic human rights, this is not anti-Semitism this is basic reaction that you and I (or anyone) would be likely to feel if they were put into the position that Palestinians face every day.

Attached is the dissertation (with all the stupid beaurocratic bits removed). Please let me know what you think. If you get a chance you might want to watch this: http://video.google.co.uk/videoplay?docid=-1476609219299277245&q=paddy+ashdown&total=19&start=0&num=10&so=0&type=search&plindex=0

I have an enormous amount of respect for Paddy Ashdown and I definitely identify with his position. Also Shlomo Ben Ami (former Israeli foreign minister) is excellent in this interview on the Canadian show 'Democracy now': http://www.democracynow.org/finkelstein-benami.shtml

Thanks again for the book. I'm obviously keen to learn more!

Best Wishes,

Phil

ان شاء الله

2007-07-17T09:47:00.000+01:00

ان شاء الله

Inshallah : ان شاء الله

inshallah [in shállə]

or insh'allah [in shállə]

interjection

if God wills: an expression meaning 'if God wills', used to suggest that something in the future is uncertain

[Mid-19th century. šā 'Allāh ]

It’s a simple word, and it’s used here a lot. I’d heard it before I arrived here, and then, and until perhaps recently, the real significance of its meaning hadn’t hit me. As the definition states, it is an expression of human fallibility in relation to higher power.

This, I’m afraid isn’t a post relating my conversion to any particular religion or even to any kind of deistic philosophy either, I’m afraid there is a lot more convincing left to be done to this particular religious sceptic before I’m ‘saved’ by anyone or anything.

The particular significance of the phrase ‘Inshallah’ for me isn’t that in regular everyday speech human beings will humble themselves before god; it is that human beings recognise their humility and insignificance in relation to anything at all.

In so much of our lives we promote ourselves as the masters of our own destiny, praising attributes such as determination, authority, commitment to a cause, and value our own limited perspective above all others. I’m particularly guilty of this, I always know more and understand better than any and all of my opponents, and when they disagree, the have never bested me it is simply that they’ve either cheated or are lucky ****ers.

A few recent events that have occurred here, and in some way small way affected me, have reminded me that perhaps the time to start being more humble is now.

These events were more along the lines of unwitting collisions: by simply going about my daily business, pursuing interesting research leads and participating in a life that was seemingly normal for me I have collided with extraordinary events that have jarred my sensibilities and have lead me to this place of quizzical bemusement.

The first of these minor ‘bumps’ was last Wednesday. I was returning to Birzeit Campus with a colleague from the PAS programme in order to interview an extremely interesting professor from the Birzeit Institute of Public Health (the facts of the interview are worthy of separate discussion, but as this is a primary source that I will use in my thesis, I’m afraid I’m going to have to protect my academic integrity and keep it confidential until after September 7th!). Upon walking through the university gates, we were suddenly confronted with the overwhelming sight of a demonstration by about 100 members of the student faction of Hamas. It was a peaceful demonstration protesting against the arrest of one of their members by the (Fatah dominated) Palestinian Police Force. There were about 2-300 other students milling around, some watching the protest, some simply making their way to class. Needless to say my college and I proceeded to make a swift exit from the scene, and headed off to do the interview.

It was after the interview (that lasted about an hour and a half) when we returned outside that a fuller story of the events became clear. After we had left, it transpired that students from the Fatah students’ faction became involved in an altercation with Hamas students. There were some scuffles and stones were thrown. The university authorities responded by ejected all that it could from campus, locking the gates and closing the university until after the weekend. No one was harmed in the altercation, and university business resumed as normal on Monday.

The second collision occurred this weekend. I went, this weekend to meet a group of other international visitors at an European-funded left leaning camp based in the town of Bili’n. One of the activities that we were to observe was the weekly protest by residents against the building of the wall which, like many places in the West Bank, strays beyond the internationally recognised boarder of the ‘green line’ on to Palestinian land. The protest was peaceful and many of the internationals participated, carrying banners and flags. They were also accompanied by a number of press crews. What was utterly absurd about this event was that the IDF soldiers (who were protected by full body armour, with armoured vehicles, behind a 25 foot electrified fence, which, in turn is proceeded by about 10 metres by a mass of barbed wire) were ready waiting for the demonstration, and had already fired several canisters of tear gas even before the protesters arrived.

I remained far from the demonstration at all times, standing, with others, on a mound about 300metres away from the fence. This did not protect us from tear gas which was launched from a bazooka by a soldier sitting in the back of a jeep.

Tear gas, from a distance, does what it says – It makes your eyes run uncontrollably and it also smells horrible. When it is fired at you and lands within 100 metres or so the effects are much more unpleasant. The gas prevents you from breathing, forces you to close your eyes, and makes your face sting like its being exposed to an open flame.

When the land the gas canisters take about 2-3 seconds to activate, when a small explosive charge opens the compression mechanism and distributes the gas into the surrounding atmosphere. This has two immediate effects on the environment:

1. When the earth is particularly dry, and when the canister lands in dead plant matter, the explosive charge may ignite the matter and causing an uncontained conflagration.
2. The effect of the short delay in the release of the gas provides its targets with a few seconds in which to run away intending to avoid the gas’s unpleasant effects. The knock-on-effect of this is that in running, the target elevates his or her breathing rate and inhales more oxygen.

Despite our distance from the primary demonstration, the soldiers fired gas at us. The fire from the previous canisters was already roaring, and when we saw the canister descending toward us, we inevitably began to run away in different directions. The wind, however, was not on my side that day, nor was the fact that more canisters were fired into the path I was running.

The experience was incredibly frightening, for the first time in a long time I honestly panicked for my life. I was running as hard as I could, but with every breath I felt my lungs fill with more gas. After about 100 or so meters I was still surrounded by gas, and felt like I couldn’t run anymore without air. I wanted to sink to my knees and tell them that I didn’t want to play anymore. For those few seconds of gasping, I can tell you now, that I have never ever been more afraid in my life.

Eventually, after what seemed like far too long, I got clear of the gas, and holding half an onion to my nose with the intention of countering the effect on my breathing, I started to spit out all the saliva in my mouth – trying desperately to clear the taste and smell of the gas. It took about another 10 minutes or so for me to gather my breath and to calm down before returning to the vantage point. By this time the fire had spread and had separated some of the protesters from the main group. Also the television crews had also come under fire and had retreated to a further distance.

One of the protestors we could see began to throw stones at the IDF (while under international law the permissibility of symbolic violence, with no realistic chance of causing serious injury or death – such as stone throwing, or flag burning - toward an oppressive military force is generally recognised as permissible,[1] I can’t think of many things that seemed more stupid to do in that context than to throw stones at very well protected men with guns). The reaction of the troops was inevitable, and we again retreated to a safer distance behind cover. We later discovered that that particular protester was shot in the leg with a rubber bullet, only to stand up again and hurl another stone.

Fearing more gunfire, and more gas, I did not return to a position where I could see the rest of the demonstration. It is worth noting that the Palestinians who attended that day protest against the wall, and suffer those retaliations EVERY SINGLE WEEK after Friday prayer.

The third collision with powers greater than myself was the following day. Still with the international camp I’d spent the morning in the city of Qalqilyah and then in a nearby village, meeting with community groups and sampling some of the pretty incredible traditional Palestinian food. It was on the way back to Bili’n that we passed through one of the permanent checkpoints that ‘provide security for the state of Israel’ (there are some 47 permanent checkpoints within the occupied territory, only 17 of these control passage between the OTs and Israel. On average there are 200 ‘flying’ or temporary checkpoints between Palestinian cities and towns). As is likely for most foreign visitors, my experience of checkpoints has been one of fleeting annoyance; soldiers will stop your vehicle, check your passport and perhaps offer some ‘amusing’ comment about how he/she hopes you are enjoying your time in ‘Israel’. This time I was on a bus with a large number of Palestinians.

The bus was required to pull over; everybody was made to get off and submit identification, and then bus and all our belongings were searched. Several of the Palestinians were separated from the rest of us, and we were informed that they did not have the proper permission to travel to this part of Palestine. They were taken away and we were told that they would be returned to their town of origin. While this in itself is preposterous (imagine being pulled over by on your way between Manchester and London by a soldier of a foreign army, speaking a foreign language, and, under the threat of arrest, ordered to return home… and then image that every time you seek to travel anywhere in the UK you run the risk of the same thing happening again), but it was what happened next was the trigger for a re-realisation in my own mind that I really don’t actually understand very much of this conflict at all.

One of the internationals in our party began to lose his temper with the soldier, quoting international law, and threatening to report him to his own government should any harm come to those Palestinians who had by now already been taken away. It dawned on me all of a sudden; this soldier was not going to listen. He, and the Palestinians we were with, had probably heard these very sentiments expressed dozens, if not hundreds of times, from people like this man, and from people like me.

We visit this place, and are so alarmed by the difference in life, and the outright horror of what ever side we are exposed to - regardless of weather the victim we present ourselves with is an Israeli family who have lost a relatives or friends to an act of terrorism, or one of the many many many Palestinians who have lived their whole lives in the dim, hopeless light of occupation - our response is always the same: we want to be the cavalry! Riding from over the hill at the last second… to make the world aware, and by extension, to save our particular victim from the horror that we have only seen a tiny fraction of.

We have to quit wanting to be the savour, particularly in the holy land. We have to take stock of our own emotional reactions, and appreciate that we, like the people we surround ourselves by, come from somewhere, and our perceptions are just as framed as those we disagree with.

Of course when I learned of the extent of the Hamas, Fatah altercation at Birzeit my first thought was ‘how stupid’. And, of course I was made both afraid and incredibly angry by the disproportionate use of force by the IDF against the protesters, and by the observatory of the checkpoint regulations and the unsympathetic attitude of the Soldiers. Indeed my first reaction to almost everything I perceive here is one of extreme emotion one way or the other. Yet with that heated exchange between the Soldier and the International it really dawned on me on a deeper level than my academic acceptance of structural theory, simply put: There, but for the grace of God, go I.

There, but for the grace of God, go I.

It’s worth repeating.

If god had willed it, or if the many forces in this universe, that aremore powerful than I, had aligned slightly differently: I could have been (and still could be) the perpetrator of any of the actions I’d perceived over those few days. Had I been thrown into the universe in a different environment, with different parents, and educated differently – either by the State of Israel or under the oppression of the occupation, I could have been a participant in the altercation at Birzeit, or an IDF soldier firing tear gas at unarmed civilians, or on either side in any of these collisions. Moreover, had this alternative reality transpired, and I’d become: not Phil the Peace Studies student from the UK, but Phil the IDF soldier, or Phil the Palestinian stone thrower, I am sure as anything that it would be the same feelings of fear, rage, and being utterly overwhelmed, that I felt in an incredibly small way over the last few days, that would be present and be the guiding light for my understanding of the world in those instances.

Without even considering the prospects for a lasting peace in this region, what must occur for even the slightest reduction in hostility between these two sides is for somehow the capacity for this conflict to be comprehended as more than the apocalyptic zero-sum. As an outsider, it is my absolute duty to act in no other way than with the greatest patients with all participants and with all events, and to hold firm to no position at the expense of a deeper understanding of the way others live… Inshallah.

[1] Falk, Richard, (Winter, 2002) “Azmi Bishara, the Right of Resistance, and the Palestinian Ordeal” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2. pp. 19-33. (http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0377-919X%28200224%2931%3A2%3C19%3AABTROR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K)

Declassified document

2007-07-10T15:33:00.000+01:00

Excerpt from the secret CIA assessment submitted to President Truman

November 28, 1947 on the eve of the UN "vote" and titled "The Consequences of the Partition of Palestine" (Now Declassified document):

"Armed hostilities between Jews and Arabs will break out if the UN General Assembly accepts the plan to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states....The Jews are expected to be able to mobilize some 200,000 fighters in Palestine.. The Jewish armed groups in Palestine are well equipped and well trained in commando tactics. Initially they will achieve marked success over the Arabs because of superior organization and equipment....The US by supporting partition has already lost much of its prestige in the Near East In the event that partition is imposed on Palestine, the resulting conflict will seriously disturb the social, economic, and political stability of the Arab world, and US commercial and strategic interests will be dangerously jeopardized. ..The poverty, unrest, and hopelessness upon which Communist propaganda thrives will increase throughout the Arab world. (and later in the document, p. 6) US prestige on the other hand has steadily decreased with each new indication that the US supports the Zionists. The good will enjoyed by the US at the time of the Roosevelt-Ibn Saud Conference and following backing of Lebanese and Syrian claims for independence was short lived as a result of President Truman's support of Jewish immigration to Palestine and of the Anglo-American Committee report. Because of the long standing cultural ties between the US and the Arab world, the friendly role that the US played in the achievement of Syrian and Lebanese independence, the partial dependence of certain Arab states on oil royalties from US companies, and the promise of increased royalties in the future, the Arab states would like to maintain friendly relations with the US. ... Little of this (positive) development will be possible, if the US supports a Jewish state in Palestine."

Bloggy Bloggy

2007-06-29T11:13:00.000+01:00

Aiieeeee! its been a long while since I've blogged. Honestly, it's because I've just been so busy, to-ing and fro-ing all round Palestine collecting data and trying to get a feel of this fantastically interesting land.

I'm living in Ramallah right now, not too far from the Center of town, but far enough away to be a long way from any trouble. The University course in Arabic is going really well, if a bit slow. One thing I'm sure of is that I'm getting the basics down clearly, and pronouncing the difference between ﺥandﺡ is something I will never ever take lightly or be confused about ever again!

I've been unbelievably busy thus far for my research, it almost seems like I really had no clue at all about the nature of the occupation or the reality of resistance before coming. I am cirtainly no expert on what it is like to be a palestinian but I feel, now at least I am grasping the scale of these issues. Anyway here is a brief list of things I've been doing before I go into more detail..
Visited Tulkarem in the north,
Visited Jerico in the south,
Spent a day at the Dead Sea,
Attended a conference in Jerusalem on the water issue,
Attended another (brilliant) conference in Jerusalem on the role of the international community,
Interviewed a bunch of people, Primarily focused on the issue of Education under Occupation so far,
Visited a very very impressive organization working with children at Dheisheh refugee camp near Bethlehem,
Visited the church of the nativity in Bethlehem and various other holy places,
Mooched to Franco-german cultural exchange musical event...
Saw Souad Massi!!! in concert in Ramallah
Read a hell of a lot of Edward Said!
Been to Class every day... which is harder than it sounds, it starts at 8am!

ahhhh.... I will write more tomorrow... I am such a crap blogger

Jerusalem

2007-06-19T19:50:00.000+01:00

This is a bit of a touristy post. I'm going to keep it brief because although Jersualem is very beautiful and almost overwhelming, I feel like I should get back to writing about interesting things that have been in the news recently, and a lot of other things about the West Bank that I simply could not have comprehended uptil I've seen them.

Jerusalem is pretty much divided into three major and very distinct sections, the West, the East, and the Old City.

The West is very modern, full of shops and wouldn't feel out of place in a European or North American Country. It’s the home of the Knesset and most of the Israeli administrations. It’s very clean and what I saw was very plush. There are lots of police and troops around too. Everyone has guns, even members of the public were wondering round with huge rifles.

The Old City is just amazing, it’s the home of the holy sights, the Temple Mount with the famous Western wall, the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. It’s a pretty small (in comparison to the rest of Jerusalem) area enclosed within ancient walls, but the streets are tiny and wriggly and totally packed with merchants of all kinds. Children and you youths are always crossing and running from place to place pushing and pulling carts of fruit and boxes of all different kinds.

The holy sights are something else.

The Western wall is where I started, its pretty much as you see in the pictures, men pray on the left and women on the right. for a man you must have ur head covered if you want to approach the wall yet that appears to be the only formality. I felt very welcome there. I was told that it is a place of worship for people of all religions by a nice man from Manchester!

We then went to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, which is built on the ground where Jesus died and was raised to heaven. It not particularly impressive from the outside, but as soon as you walk in you are sure that you are in somewhere very holy! Its quite dark and when the monks are not singing him there is a peaceful hush in the whole place. It is a deceptively large building with many passageways and rooms that you almost stumble upon. The last five stations of the cross are here, and I was fortunate enough to see the last one in Christ’s tomb, which is a very small awkward little room now, fantastically decorated on the outside and with paintings and incense on the inside. Its hard to describe being there, what overwhelms you is the feeling of the place not anyone thing.

The Al-Asqa Mosque complex is huge! It is actually a large plaza-type area surrounded by walls which is home to both the Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, which is the big gold building you see in the pictures. The Dome, as the name implies, houses a holy rock. It is what Mohamed was standing upon when he ascended to heaven. Marks on the rock are attributed to the foot prints of the profit and to the hand prints of the archangel Gabriel who held the rock to the earth when it tried to follow Mohamed to heaven. It really is an amazing place and as long as you are dress modestly there is little formality imposed on anyone, I saw children playing football and running around while some people prayed and some people (like me) sheltered from the heat.

Emily and I also climbed the Mount of Olives which is very very very steep and is home to various holy sites. There are large Jewish cemeteries because this is judgement day will occur, and some believe that being buried here equates to a good place in line (according to the guide book). The view from the Mount of Olives is amazing, all across the old city and beyond. Unfortunately the Mount of Olives exposed us to East Jerusalem, which is predominately neglected by the city authorities and a large mound (very very very large) of rubbish has accumulated due to the city neglecting to do regular trash collections.

It was from the east that we caught our first glimpse of the Wall! I’ve got a lot to say about the wall, but this is not the place to do it. It is sufficient to tell you that despite international protests and the assertion of its illegality by the international community, the UN and the world court, the wall still stands. East Jerusalem was captured during the 1967 war and according to UNSCR 242 it is part of the occupied territories that Israel has no legal right to. Despite this fact the wall runs not through the city, but around it. Palestinians from the West Bank, of Muslim, Christian and Jewish heritage are therefore cut off from their holy sites and all the amenities that the “Capital City” and the State of Israel have to offer, while Palestinians on the Israeli side of the wall are forbidden to visit friends and family on the other.

From Jerusalem the wall is an ugly shameful disgrace which, from what I can tell, misrepresents the true nature of both the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. Elsewhere on the west bank, however, the wall has ruined lives.

Pictures are available here and here.

Stoke - London - Tel Aviv - Jerusalem

2007-06-12T18:56:00.000+01:00

Very short post because I'm totally fried right now.

I got here! Everything is fine so far. Its very hot and I've seen lots of holy things today. I'm staying in the old city in Jerusalem walking distance from the Western (Wailing) Wall and the Dome of the Rock etc. Went to the place where Jesus died and rose again... In fact I went inside his tome.... anyway the view of the city is astonishing, and you can see it from the roof of the hostle. I'll post some photos when I've slept a little bit. Frankly I can't believe I'm here.

Violence today in Ramallah so I'm keeping a close eye on the news. If it flares up seriously this may end up being a very short trip.

Gaza, Occupation 101...

2007-06-10T21:45:00.000+01:00

Gaza is going to be in the news a lot this summer. Last year Israeli settlers were withdraw, this year, I fear a lot of people are going to lose their lives. I'm not going to go there because frankly I think its too big a risk to take, and I'm afraid of being killed for it. If you want to see some of the conditions that provide the context for this violence tho, you should read John Pilger's artical I mentioned in an earlier post, and you should watch this clip from 'Occupation 101': Here.

The day before...

2007-06-10T15:36:00.000+01:00

I leave tomorrow... I'm nervous today!

Slingshots and “Sarafs"

2007-06-05T10:34:00.000+01:00

Slingshots and ‘Sarafs’ 1 is the working title for my dissertation, and it is actually about the fifth rewording I have come up with in just the few short weeks since I started working on the project. A previous incarnation was ‘David and Goliath’, a reference to mythical story of the young, Israelite, Sheppard boy’s miraculous victory over the Philistine ‘Giant’ and champion, Goliath, that is documented in Biblical and Qu'anic texts. The current title certainly draws from the sentiment expressed with that ancient myth. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict is, and has been for a long time, 2 a conflict between two antagonists that is so vastly unequal in terms of military might and economic resources, that, short of a similar miracle it appears to be almost irresolvable at this point.

Apart from the aesthetic fact that the term ‘David and Goliath’ is perhaps overused in reference to this conflict, I was keen to use a title that was more descriptive of the actual conditions facing modern day antagonists while maintaining the core of the original sentiment. The slingshot, therefore, is not only the weapon which David used to incapacitate his foe, it is also the weapon that’s use grew in prominence during the first Intifada) and perhaps best captured in symbolism of the resistance by Palestinian children to the extraordinary might of the Israeli military. The slingshot is something that is held in the hand of the antagonist and fires projectile, usually stones, toward the target. The ‘Saraf’, on the other hand, is a brand new weapon, in April of 2007 the Israel government took delivery of the first three of a final contingent of eighteen from the US based Boeing Corporation4 The ‘Saraf’ is the latest upgraded version of the well known Apache Helicopter. The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) website refers to it as “the most advanced of all aircraft5 its can operate during day or night operations and in all weathers and in any part of the world. Perhaps most revelling is that in contrast to the slingshots dependence on the accuracy of human judgement, the aircraft possesses a new “automatic target selection and a new missile target system” which is nicknamed, tellingly: “Launch and Forget". 6

1‘Sarafs’ are sometimes translated as ‘Sharafs’, the Original product designation from Boeing is AH-64D Apache Longbow. (http://www.boeing.com/rotorcraft/military/ah64d/)

2Since 1967, in its current form.

4 Al Jazeera online (http://www.aljazeera.com/me.asp?service_ID=7602)

5 IDF Website (http://www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?sl=EN&srch=&id=6&clr=1)

6 IDF Website (http://www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?sl=EN&srch=&id=6&clr=1): Tran, M., “Abbas appeals for US help” in The Guardian, Friday May 18, 2007 (available online at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,,,00.html, last accessed 23/05/:51:13), At the time of writing, Israeli helicopter gun ships are involved in missile attacks, primarily, against those who they identify as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in and around Gaza City in response to rocket attacks on nearby Israeli towns from Gaza. It is not clear weather the ‘Sarafs’ are operational in these missions, however the extraordinary gulf in military strength is evident here nonetheless.

"Battle for the Holy Land"

2007-06-05T09:58:00.000+01:00

Obviously I recommend all of the videos I've put on the sidebar of this blog, but if there is one to watch about Jerusalem (Yerushaláyim: יְרוּשָׁלַיִם /al-Quds: القُدس) - its this one:

"Battle for the Holy Land"

Peace, Justice: Hegemony...

2007-06-04T22:04:00.001+01:00

It is a concept that all politicians will deny, but most political science student will tell you about until they (and probably you) are blue in the face, is that control of the narrative is power. 'Peace' and 'Justice' are great tools to control the narrative, particularly in the context of protracted conflict: 'Justice' defines the threshold between what is acceptable, and what is not.

'Peace' is an even better tool, it doesn't even need a definition, it just 'is'... We just assume peace to be a state of affairs which is simply better than what exists now. Its vague enough for everyone to agree that its a good idea. without discussing what it actually means.

Problems arise when we apply our assumptions of 'justice' to what is acceptable to think and to say - and when we start using 'peace' as a battering ram, and as by-word for hegemony... and then take these concepts as premises for the narrative, then these noble sounding terms are weapons of war.

As an illustraition of this, we may consider a comparison between the treatment of the narrative of the 'Indian Mutiny', as discussed in The Other Side of the Medal (Edward Thompson, 1926) and the discussion of 'Islamist Terrorism' at the time of the Oslo accords (c. 1993) - a comparison that is still, I believe, relevant today.

From: "The Campaign Against 'Islamic Terror'", in The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After, Edward Said, Granta Books: London, 2000. p. 44- 50.

"Most British historians of India, for example, described the famous "Mutiny" of 1857 as a barbarous, terroristic attack on defenseless women and children, thereby convertying the Indian into a savage barbarian to whom the only response was force. Thompson points out that for the Indians the "Mutiny" was in fact a rebellion in their struggle against the British, provoked by generations of punishing colonization, racist discrimination, and savage imperial repression of Indian independence ...

... 'Our misrepresentation of Indian history and character is one of the things that have so alienated the educated classes of India that even their moderate elements have refuses to help the Reforms [of colonial policy]. Those measures, because of this sullenness, have failed, when they deserved a better fate." ... Great, deliberate bloody and indiscriminately violent actions like the 1857 mutiny or the recent bombings in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv are ugly, indefensible things ... Cynical manipulations of religion are appalling: to kill children or buys passengers in the name of God is a horror to be conditionally condemned, as much as one should also condemn leaders who send young people on suicide missions. But there has been little more obdurate and arrogant than the Israeli and American response, with its sanctimonious choruses against terrorism, Hamas, Islamic fundamentalism ...

... The fact is that the peace process has been an offense to the Palestinian spirit. Each declaration of its virtue, each resounding complement paid to it, each parade and celebratory event, has reminded Palestinians how their history as the native inhabitants of Palestine who were deliberately kicked off their own land, their society destroyed, the West Bank and Gaza kept under military occupation for twenty-nine years [now 40!], has been ignored, violated, misrepresented. Terrorism is bred out of poverty, desperation, a sence of powerlessness and utter misery ...

... Only when Muslims totally fall into line, speak the same language, take the same measures as Israel and United States do, can they be expected to be 'normal,' at which point of course the are no longer really Arab and Muslim. The have simply become 'peace makers.' What a pity that so noble an idea as 'peace' has become a corrupted embellishment of power masquerading as reconciliation."

A few statistics about Gaza...

2007-06-04T20:57:00.000+01:00

With all the recent media coverage of 'terrorist attacks' in Gaza i.e. rockets being launched out of the Gaza strip into Israel, and the IDF's military response, I thought it was high time for just a few facts about the state of things in Gaza that we don't normally here about.

This extract is from John Pilger's article "Children of the Dust" in last week's New Statesman (28th May 2007, p. 26-28: Please try and read the full article it is availible online at: http://www.newstatesman.com/):

"More than 40 per cent of the population of Gaza are children under the age of 15. Reporting on a four-year field study in occupied Palestine for the British Medical Journal, Dr Derek Summerfield wrote that "two-thirds of the 621 children killed at checkpoints, in the street, on the way to school, in their homes, died from small arms fire, directed in over half of cases to the head, neck and chest - the sniper's wound". A friend of mine with the United Nations calls them "children of the dust". Their wonderful childishness, their rowdiness and giggles and charm, belie their nightmare.

I met Dr Khalid Dahlan, a psychiatrist who heads one of several children's community health projects in Gaza. He told me about his latest survey. "The statistic I personally find unbearable," he said, "is that 99.4 per cent of the children we studied suffer trauma. Once you look at the rates of exposure to trauma, you see why: 99.2 per cent of the study group's homes were bombarded; 97.5 per cent were exposed to tear gas; 96.6 per cent witnessed shootings; 95.8 per cent witnessed bombardment and funerals; almost a quarter saw family members injured or killed."

In my opinion, as a bit of a structuralist... when we talk about 'terrorism' in Gaza particular, we shouldn't be talking about the 'right to resist' or on the other hand 'the right to security' we should maybe just think, in practice terms - what on earth else do we expect human beings to do in these circumstances?!

If I were to walk round Lancaster campus tomorrow and punch every one I saw once in the face, I might be lucky a few times: I might punch a pacifist the first time, and an elderly lady the second time, and so avoid any retaliation. But, if I did it a hundred times surely the common sence conclusion would be that most people would resist, and probably do anything they could to resist me.

So, if an overcrowded city is encircled within a wall, trapped between the sea on one side and the IDF on the other, where "4,000 Palestinians have been killed (half of them children)" (Ilan Pappe, in Pilger, p. 27) by Israeli forces, all international aid is cut off, people live in constant fear and chaos of a military occupation... forget 'justice' and 'rights' - they don't come into it - why do we expect them to do anything else other than hit back.

Palestine, Israel and Pan-Arabic identiy

2007-05-27T21:45:00.000+01:00

Again, this is taken from an essay, I don't really expect many people to read these posts, however, I want to put them here as an effort to show that my research is entirely performed 'in good faith' with full disclosure - these are the my interpretations of the facts the research I've done so far.

The Roots of Pan-Arabism

The decade of the 1940s was a period of profound change in the Middle East. The creation of Israel, the flight and homelessness of several hundred thousand Palestinians, the formation of the Arab league, the achievement of independence by the core Arab states, and the decline of Britain and France and the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as world powers clearly represented new and significant developments for the region. 1

In order to give the most informative exegesis of the history of pan-Arabism the following discussion adopts a segmented approach. The object of the narratives is to present as much factual information as is relevant and allow for appropriate analysis in the following sections. Subsection one, uses the Israeli-Palestinian issue as an exemplar of the inconstancy of a purely pan-Arabic doctrine. This subsection tracks the plight of Palestinian Arabs in particular, over the chronological period from rise of Zionism and the first waves of major Jewish immigration (c.1890s-1920s) prior to Israel’s inception, to September of 1970. It is followed by a brief theoretical account that exposes the thematic currents flowing through it. Subsection two covers and compares the formation of the failed United Arab Republic with other, more successful, intra-regional partnerships. Each of these subsections mark instances of the rise to prominence of modern pan-Arabism and its causes for its decline.

Arab Nationalism in relation to Zionism, c.1900s-1948.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century waves of Jewish immigration into mandated Palestine had become a serious issue. From the beginning “the Arabs of Palestine recognised that the goals of Zionism represented a threat to their existence.2 When their negotiations with the British governing body failed to lead to the instigation of immigration restrictions, the situation descended into violent rebellion. Between 1933 and 1936 a mass influx of refugees from Europe doubled the size of the Jewish population and adding to the anxiety of the Arab community.3

On the 14^th May 1948 Israel became independent of the British Empire and a new legal state recognised by the United Nations and the greater international community. The following day Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan and Iraq invaded that territory under the auspices of the Arab League. The war lasted until December and ended in a devastating defeat for the combined Arabic armies.4 The war followed the failure of a United Nation’s proposed compromise on the future of mandated Palestinian territory and directly led to a more-than doubling of the size of the Palestinian refugee population existing in neighbouring states. Israel’s response was to consolidate territory outside the original borders and to build a defensive military force that could secure the nation’s existence against any further threats. The Arab invasion was characterised by two major factors. The force was vastly outnumbered, under-prepared, and disorganised in comparison to their enemy, and importantly, the combined command structure was “hampered by inter-Arab political rivalries. 5 Defeat was also an acute embarrassment for those in power, particularly in the ‘core Arabic states’ of Egypt, Syria and Iraq who had promised that they “stood ready to defend them [the Palestinians] militarily.6

In 1948, the recession of Europe’s imperial influence followed by the Arabic military failure meant a radically new political landscape for the region was instantiated. Israel as an established state, posed a different challenge to Arabic states than had the European empires. Where, primarily the British, had been concerned with governing as a means to extraction of wealth, it had been in their interest to maintain stability. Consequently colonialists had no interest in undermining the existing regimes where they remained acquiescent to their aims. The new country was however a potential direct threat to the territory, culture and especially the newly found political freedom and aspirations of the ruling Arab elites. To the populations with Israel’s bordering nations, the 700,000 displaced Palestinians, demonstrated the ruthlessness of the annexation. The vast refugee camps provided a vivid exhibition of what could possibly be their own fate should Israel seek expansion. 7

Structuralism – a thematic analysis

According to the structuralist approach to conflict theory the Arab-Israeli war would have occurred against the backdrop of “cultural violence.8 For Galtung and other structural theorists, violent conflict becomes manifest due to the presence of structural inequalities between the two sides, which is ‘justified’ to the antagonists themselves, and to outside interest parties, by the instigation of ‘cultural violence’. In essence ‘cultural violence’ is the aspect of conflict where identity is at issue rather than any physical material issues. Galtung’s concept of cultural violence is cyclical in nature. Due to the instigation of direct and structural violence, cultural identity becomes more prominent in the mindset of those under oppression. As cultural identity increases in prominence it develops as the justification for retaliation for the underdog, and for continued alienation of the two parties per se. 9

C.R. Mitchell’s The Structure of International Conflict continues the discussion of the psychology of conflict, explaining that at an individual’s identification with a group dynamic or cultural identity is a necessary means by which the individual may alleviate potentially harmful levels of mental stress. “There is considerable evidence that images, attitudes, prejudices, emotions and beliefs can be relatively homogenous across a great number of individuals”.10 The inception of Israel as a potential threat to the newly found freedom of the Arab world fits into this theoretical approach. Israel had penetrated the regional order and acceded to a position of structural domination with the assistance of the United Nations and the retreating British Empire. Israel then dominated its opponents via direct violence in the 1948, and subjugated the existing Arabic population. The resultant peak in pan-Arabic hegemony was therefore, in structural terms, only to be expected.11

Collapse of anti-Israel, pro-Palestine, hegemony: June 1967 – September 1970.

The Palestinian issue continued to be a major cause for the propagation of homogeneous Arab identity until tension developed into conflict again in 1967. The joint military endeavour of the ‘June war’ again ended in disaster for the coalition of Arab states. The Palestinian refugee crisis was compounded and further territory, including Jerusalem, was lost, as show in the following maps. 12

Israel’s military success was followed by another attempt by the United Nations to find peace and territorial compromise. While the resolution emphasized the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war".13& 14 The resolution made did make a major and if not immediate impact on the context of the region. After a failed attempt in, 1973 by Egypt and Syria to take back the Sinai, and the Golan Heights, Egypt signed UNSCR 338, which re-iterated 242. It was a separate peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, and thus the Palestinians lost their most powerful ally. and called for an Israeli withdrawal, it provided for no material means of enforcement for such requests. It failed to recognise potential Palestinian sovereignty and referred only to “achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem”. Jordan also accepted an uneasy peace, leaving Syria as the only belligerent government. “The June war was a turning point, and although the notion of an Arab nation retained a grip on the Arab imagination …secular nationalism as a culture and model of modernization was …a failure in the Middle East".15

For the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) the irrelevance of the United Nations (UN) as a proponent of a fair solution was palpably confirmed by UNSCR 242. Egypt and Jordan’s acceptance of the resolution was, however, a much more serious blow to the Palestinian cause. It demonstrated the scale of the cleavage within pan-Arabism that had been on the rise since the 1950’s. The Palestinian response was to move to a more radical and nationalist approach. In 1969 Yasir Arafat, the leader of al Fatah movement, was elected to the chairmanship of the PLO. This signalled a major change in the nature of the organisation which had been formed in 1964 under the behest of the Arab League. It had been lead thus far by predominantly intellectual elite, and framed within various political ideologies such as Marxism, Baathism and pan-Arabism.16 Al Fatah offered an alternative, they endorsed Palestinian resistance to Israel, including by violent means, as a primary political goal, free from qualification from broader political philosophies. 17 It was “an appealing and readily comprehensible message to a broad cross-section of Palestinian". 18

Where al Fatah led on the political front, other factions within the PLO followed militarily. In 1970 acting virtually autonomously, but in the name of the PLO, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) launched a guerrilla war from within Jordanian territory. By September of that year the PFLP had effectively formed a “state-within-a-state”19&20 From the 15^th-25^{th. 21}Civilians and paramilitaries alike were killed, not by the hand of Zionists, but by Arabic soldiers, under the orders of an Arabic king. ‘Black September’ fundamentally undermined the primacy of pan-Arabic unity. The PLO was forced to re-locate to Lebanon, and the guerrilla war became terrorism, indeed a threat to individual Israelis, but no longer a danger to the future of the state. and thus formed a serious threat the authority of King Husayn. of September the Jordanian Army ruthlessly, and indiscriminately, re-imposed the King’s power over the area’s controlled by the PFLP. At the end of the ten days, 3,000 Palestinians lay dead.

Intra-Arab politics and Pan-Arabism (with reference to applicable extra-regional factors).

In the previous subsection we discussed the rise and descent of pan-Arabism in relation to an opposing, and threatening, form of identity. In this subsection we will unearth the instances that demonstrate the complexities of pan-Arabic identity from within. The best way to begin this analysis is to briefly note the phenomena of Arabic supra-state institutions. Of the 11 major supranational institutions/treaty organisations that have existed since 1945, 22 only the Arab League is both entirely and exclusively Arabic, and still survives.23 Out of the others that have developed over that period of time, and have remained in existence, we can see a common respect for the sovereignty which contradicts the most ambitions elements of the political ideology of pan-Arabic integration. For an explanation of this apparent paradox we must no longer limit our perspective to looking at the states through the prism of ideological discourse, but also appreciate the ideology itself from the perspective of national governments.

Theoretical conclusions

As the example demonstrates, identity in the Middle Eastern states is a constant and yet fluid concept. It is not powerful enough on its own to create lasting homogeny in absence of core material interdependencies. However, in times of crisis, the appeal of unification can develop into a cycle of self-referential justifications. Group identity of any form, is fundamentally a practically necessary proxy of personal identity. The existence of a threat to one’s group is a threat to one’s own existence. It causes an increase in an individual’s focus on what is apparently familiar, and thus self-preserving, in contrast to what is unfamiliar. Such a focus extenuates the perceived differences and makes the disparity more pronounced, and thus increases the perceived danger of the threat. Living with such a cycle is, however, an extremely stressful and exhausting condition, and as a result one cannot maintain it as a primary thought process indefinitely.24

When attention diverges from the threat, one’s concern will be other aspects of life critical to existence. The state of the economy, living conditions and political access for example are all material issues that will also be high priorities. It is my argument that, the individual, whether a member of the ruling elite, or a member of the populace, will react to any given perceived threat against existence by seeking solidarity with those they are most familiar with. However, when that threat has passed or, become less pressing, the reality of issues such as poverty or political irrelevance, return to their positions of high priority issues. As we have seen through the concept of omnibalancing, above, this analysis is as applicable to the mindset of national governments as much as it is to the individual person, and it is particularly applicable to Middle Eastern states due to the problematic of post-colonial legitimacy.

The central pursuit of most MENA [Middle East and North African] regimes remains that of domestic survival – and the search for legitimacy, acquiescence and control to assure this, in turn supported by a sear for recourses to deploy in this domestic quest. The root of these dynamics remains in the inadequate ‘stateness’ of many of the countries in question, combined with a failure to ‘perform’ either politically or economically. 25

W.Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Oxford: Westview Press, 2004), p. 270.

Ibid.: p.254.

J. Bill and R. Springborg, Politics in the Middle East (Harlow: Longman, 2000), p. 243.

W. Cleveland, op. cit., p.267.

Ibid.: p.266.

Cf. W.Cleveland, op. cit., pp. 243-266.: Also N.B. J. Bill and R. Springborg, op. cit., p. 231.:The massacre of 250 civilians at Dayr Yassin.

J. Galtung. “Cultural Violence” Journal of Peace Research (Vol. 27, No. 3. aug., 1990), pp. 291-305.

J. Galtung. Peace by Peaceful means: Peace and Conflict Development and Civilization (London: SAGE Publications, 1996).

C. Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict, (London, Macmillan Press, 1981). p. 71.

J. Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means, op. cit.

Source of images is http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/v3_israel_palestinians/maps/html/six_day_war.stm (last accessed: 03/01/2007 14:59:15)

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/94/IMG/NR.pdf?OpenElement, last accessed 14/01/:46:30)

UNSCR 242, op. cit.,

S. Murden, Islam, the Middle East, and the new Global Hegemony (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). p.463.

W.Cleveland, op. cit., p. 358.: More detail on the nature and growth of the PLO where relevant to the argument is included below. However, a fuller description of the organisations beginnings can be found: Cf. W.Cleveland, op. cit. pp 345-373.: A. Mosely Lesch “The Palestinians” in D. Long and B. Reich (eds.), The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa (Oxford: Westveiw Press, 1980), pp. 285-301.

Al-Fatah Constitution: http://www.fateh.net/e_public/constitution.htm (last accessed: 08/01/:50:50).

W.Cleveland, op. cit., p. 359.

Lesch, op. cit., p. 286.

The English spellings of translated proper nouns vary according to which source one refers too. For the sake of consistency, aside from in direct quotations, I have chosen to adopt the spellings in W.Cleveland, op. cit.

W.Cleveland, op. cit. p.363.

L. Fawcett, “Aliancess, Cooperation and Regionalism in the Middle East” in Fawcett (ed.) International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 173-194.,at p. 185. Also Cf. Appendix.

The Arab League”, Microsoft® Encarta® 2007 [DVD]. Microsoft Corporation, 2006.: The Arab League was formed in 1945 based on three major premises: one, the prevention of a Jewish state. The second was independence of all Arab peoples. Third, closer co-operation and yet respect for national sovereignty. Although the league has been involved in various major regional peacekeeping and military actions (Lebanese civil wars of 1958 and , along with the combined assaults on Israel detailed above) its role in recent years has been largely focused on economic, cultural and developmental policies.

C. Mitchell, op. cit.

G. Nonneman, “The Three Environments of Middle East Foreign Policy Making and Relations with Europe” in G. Nonneman (ed.) Analyzing Middle East Forign Policies: and The Relationship with Europe (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 19-42 at p.19:

Another map...

2007-05-27T17:29:00.000+01:00

This is just a really amazing map from le Monde showing the 'Palestinian Diaspora'

English Translation:

(1) Exceptions are Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza), Lebanon, Syria and Jordan.

The circles are proportional to the number of Palestinian expatriates.

Canada: 20,000

Denmark: 15,000 – 20,000

Egypt: 50,000-80,000 (according to the lowest estimates)

Iraq: 50,000

Kuwait: 38,000

Libya: 24,000

Other Arab Countries: 5,500

Other Gulf States: 106,000

Saudi Arabia: 275,000

South America: 1,000 +

Sweden: 15,000 – 18,000

United Kingdom: 1,000 +

USA: 150,000 – 200,000

A bit of history and a few maps...

2007-05-27T16:40:00.000+01:00

So! as ridiculous as may seem after my previous post's endless ramblings about the inherent flawed nature of narrative... here is a narrative! (and maps too - using maps is just about the deepest sin I could commit after basically committing myself to a fancy-pants holier-than-thou post-structuralist perspective in the previous post... what the hell tho, if you don't know where I'm going, you arn't going to read much more of this blog eh?)

So the 'narrative' is mostly a copy and paste job from one of my essays (there is also a BBC overview here):

Israel

and Palestine

The formation of a cohesive Zionist Identity.

In its modern form the Arab-Israeli conflict was rooted in the Zionist movement at the beginning of the 1880s. Anti-Semitism was prevalent across Europe, particularly in East and Russia where Jews faced pogroms along with oppressive social and economic policies. The Zionist discourse led by Theodor Herzl,¹ and Leo Pinkster² argued that the Jewish community would never find acceptance in Europe and therefore the best option for a successful Jewish community would be the formation of a new, separate state. Although various different locations were discussed, reference to the biblical ‘Holy Land’³ provided an extra incentive for Jewish interest. Herzl’s objectives were incorporated into the philosophy of the organisation “Hibbat Tziyyon” (“Lovers of Zion”)⁴who planned and promoted the settlement of Jews in Palestine. Immigration occurred in waves, or ‘aliyahs’,⁵ and by the time of the Balfour Declaration⁶ the number of settled Jews combined with the geo-political significance of Zionism,⁷ led the British to consider the prospect of forming an Israeli state. The rise of Fascism in Europe was cause for an upsurge in Jewish immigration, and despite restrictions levied by the British authority, by 1946 Jews accounted for 31% of the total population of the mandate.⁸ Jews had also begun to dominate the economy in both the professional and agricultural spheres.

2 Extra-regional agents: Balfour to UNSCR 338.

The Balfour Declaration was the British plan for their governance of the Middle East once the Ottoman Empire was defeated in the First World War. The partition plan for Mandate Palestine was extremely ambiguous.⁹ 1922 saw the issue of a British Government White Paper as an attempt to clarify their policy, and placate both sides. Its effect, however, was the opposite of this.¹⁰

The British era of Governance was characterized by poor communications between themselves and the local populace. The only political organization that claimed to represent the concerns of the Arabic population, the Arab Executive, was for the most part ignored by the British. Consequently, at the same time as Jewish settlers were rapidly growing in power on all of fronts of civil society, the Palestinian Arabs were left without a legitimate means of access to the political authority. This disparity provided the backdrop for violent clashes that occurred within the mandate between the two ethnic groups.¹¹

Another British commission under Lord Peel proposed a new plan for partition that was rejected by both parties.¹² When, following the end of the Second World War, Zionist acts of terrorism began to seriously damage the British infrastructure, Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Minister, deferred the issue to the United Nations (UN). The UN plan again proposed a partition, and international administration of Jerusalem (see map¹³). Although the plan was accepted by the Yishuv (Jewish settlers) it was rejected on behalf of the Arabic communities by the governments of neighbouring Arab states, who promised to defend them militarily.

3 Pan-Arabism : from cohesion to disarray.

The British withdrawal from the mandate was finalised on May 14^th 1948. The next day Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi forces mounted an invasion of the former mandate. They were beaten back by the Israeli Haganah (the Zionist paramilitary organisation that was responsible for most of the violence against the British). By mid-June this same year. Armistice and ceasefire agreements were agreed between Israel and each of the aggressor states.¹⁴ The material outcome of the war and the agreements was an increase in the size of Israel’s territory, and the effective irredinta partition of the Gaza Strip to Eqypt, and the West Bank to Transjordan.¹⁵ The war also stimulated an exodus of over 710,000 Palestinians to various Arab states.¹⁶

The recession of the British Empire and the 1948 war transformed Zionism from an activist political force to an actual Jewish state. It also meant that the status of Palestinian Arabs had changed from a majority within the mandate to a divided community, spread across various territories and without a central political authority. The international Arabic community also proved unable to organise themselves into an effective force behind the cause of Palestinian liberation.

In 1967, Israel, again, prevailed in the face of an Arabic military assault. The proposed UN resolution (242) failed to satisfy either side. It implied Israeli withdrawal only from the Syrian and Egyptian territory and did not specify withdrawal from the occupied territories.

The 1973 war was Egypt and Syria’s attempt to win back the lost territory of 1967 (Cf. map above ¹⁷). As a military exercise it failed, although it brought about UN Resolution 338 and peace negotiations in which Anwar Sadat agreed a separate peace deal between Egypt and Israel in 1979 known as the Camp David agreements.

4.4 Palestinian Liberation Movement: From the Mandate, to Cairo, …eventually to Oslo.

In 1964, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed by the Arab League. For the first time since 1948 Palestinian Arabs were provided with a political mechanism and the means to interact with each other, and allied governments.¹⁸

The 1967 war added 200,000-300,000 refugees¹⁹ to the Palestinian Diaspora,²⁰ but it had a profound effect on the nature of the PLO. With the rise to prominence of Yasser Arafat and al-Fatah,²¹ PLO transformed its central philosophy. Rather than relying on pan-Arabic unity as a means to emancipation, the PLO was to now promulgate Palestinian nationalism. A second transformation for the PLO came after Black September (1970) and their ejection from Jordan. The PLO was forced to operate as an international terrorist organisation, relocating their base from Jordan to Beirut.²²

“Legitimate rights of the Palestinian people”²³ were noted in the agreement. This, however, was interpreted very differently by each side. Israel maintained its claim to the West Bank and Gaza and with the security of a non-aggressor in the south they focused their attention on the destruction of the PLO. Israeli involvement in the Lebanese civil war, and invasions in 1978 and 1982, drove the PLO out and forced them to find a new base in distant Tunis.²⁴

There followed another period of profound change for the PLO. Various organisations operating under the PLO umbrella instigated “al-intifada” (“the opening”)²⁵ lasting from “The intensity of the Palestinian protests and the brutality of Israeli response forced international attention in the nature of Israel’s role as occupiers of these lands and called into question the future of the territories”.²⁶ In 1988 the PLO also accepted UN resolution 242, a pragmatic step that allowed the US government to engage with them as a negotiation partner at the Madrid Conference²⁷ (October 1991). Out of the Madrid conference developed the second track of negotiations that became the secretive Oslo Peace process.

5. Oslo

The Oslo agreement was born out of the Madrid Conference (September 1991), which, for the first time allowed Palestinians, who were included in the Jordanian delegation, to converse with the Israeli government directly. Secret talks convened, by Norwegian academics, were to begin in 1993. There were several factors that contributed to a similar ‘softening’ of the conflict. The ideological Likud had been defeated and replace in Israel’s Government, by the far more pragmatic Labour party. The Intifada had reached stalemate; Israel had not managed to destroy the militant groups, and the PLO leadership, based in Tunis, without direct involvement in the fighting were in danger of becoming irrelevant to the Palestinian cause. Israel was also being put under pressure by the Bush administration to sue for peace as a requirement for continued financial support.²⁸

The Oslo agreements made some apparently fast progress, however, when the joint “Declaration of Principles” (Oslo I) was announced in 1993 it was in the form of a phased plan not a peace treaty. Many of the issues of major contention were not resolved²⁹ and both sides agreed that the plan would lead to further talks, and eventually, agreement in 1998. Oslo II, declared in Washington D.C. in 1995, was the outcome of the next round of talks. It demonstrates the vast structural inequality that the two sides still faced. In terms of territory alone, of the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority would only be permitted to claim 3%, and share 24%, Israel would claim the rest (see map³⁰)³¹

The discourse was polarized across the ethnic divide, but also within both sides. Secret talks had not been able to overcome the zero-sum dilemma,³² and the 1998 talks collapsed into the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Oslo had failed to provide a rational centre where reciprocal material concession could be matched with emotive empathy.³³ Perhaps if more of the key issues had been tackled in secret then the structural basis for peace would have undermined the material basis each side’s discourse of hostility. However, as it was, the two antagonists began the process so far apart from each other, and the sacrifices required by each of them to get to a structural centre ground would have cost more than was possible, while at the same time maintaining discursive unity across their own parities.

¹Author of The Jewish State (1896)

²Author of Auto-emancipation (1892)

³. Appendix A

⁴, W., A History of the Modern Middle East (Oxford: Westview Press, 2004), p.241.

⁵, W., op. cit. p.241.

⁶“The Balfour Declaration”, Cited in W. Laqueur and B.Rubin (eds.) The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict, (6^th ed.), (New York: Penguin, 2001), p.16.

⁷Cleveland, W., op cit. 243 “Until the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917, the British cabinet was worried that Germany might make a declaration in support of Zionist aims and thus attract a sympathetic response from US Jewry. A similar consideration arose with regard to Russia, which was on the verge of a military collapse and a social revolution.”

⁸. Cleveland, W., op. cit. p. 255.: Table 13.1 “Population of Palestine by Ethnic Group, ”.

⁹“The Balfour Declaration”, op. cit.: It spoke of “civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine” but lacked a clear plan.

¹⁰ Cleveland, W., op cit., pp 239-248.

¹¹Cleveland W., op. cit., pp. 256 - 257: e.g. Including the Wailing wall 1929 incident.

¹² Ibid.: pp. 258-261.

¹³From the University of Dartmouth (Available online: http://www.dartmouth.edu/~gov46/unscop-maj-prop-1947.gif): The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was actually divided on what the best plan for the future of Palestine would be. The minority proposition was a federated state.

¹⁴It is significant that there was no formal peace treaty as this made it possible for the Arab governments to avoid recognising Israel’s right to exist.

¹⁵ Cf. Appendix B

¹⁶“General Progress Report and Supplementary Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Covering the Period from 11 December 1949 to 23 October 1950”, From the United Nations Conciliation Commission, October 23, 1950, (U.N. General Assembly Official Records, 5th Session, Supplement No. 18, Document A/1367/Rev. 1).

¹⁷Israel: Map” Microsoft® Encarta® 2007 [DVD]. Microsoft Corporation, 2006.

¹⁸, W., op. cit., p. 258.: it was an attempt “by the Arab States to restrict Palestinian resistance activity and prevent the Palestinian movement from operating independently”.

¹⁹Bill, J. and Springborg, R., op. cit.., at p. 243.

²⁰Cf. Appendix D for the International Diaspora

²¹Ibid.: 267-8.: “Although dominated by Arafat and Fatah, the PLO since 1969 has in fact been an umbrella organization into and out of which the competitors of Fatah have drifted as the relations have waxed and waned”.: Cleveland, W., op. cit., p. 359.: “al-Fatah founders avoided tying the cause to communism, Baathism, or pan-Arabism”.

²²Smith, C. “The Arab-Israeli Conflict” in Fawcett, L., (ed.) International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 217-241, at p. 227.: “PLO actions against Israel engaged Lebanon more directly in the Arab-Israeli conflict and become a major factor in instigating a Lebanese civil war in the mid-1970s [sic].”

²³Qaundt, W., Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993) p.256 cited in Smith, C., op. cit., p. 230.

²⁴Smith, C., op cit., p. 232.

²⁵Cleveland, W., op. cit., p. 377.

²⁶Smith, C., op. cit., p. 232.

²⁷Cf. Cleveland, W., op. cit., pp. 500-502, and Smith, C., op. cit., pp. 233-234.: The Madrid Conference was convened in the aftermath of the US led war to remove Iraqi forces from their occupation of the Emirate of Kuwait ). The conference’s aim was to find an acceptable resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

²⁸Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O., and Woodhouse, T., Contemporary Conflict Resolution, (Cambrige, UK: Polity Press, 1999).

²⁹Shlaim, A., “The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process” in Fawcett, L., op. cit., pp.241-263.: No mention of a Palestinian state, 5 year plan for Palestinian autonomy, no resolution to competing claims to Jerusalem, no commitment to withdraw settlers.

³⁰Source of Map: Foundation for Middle East Peace (available online at: http://www.fmep.org/maps/map_data/redeployment/oslo_map_1995.html last accessed 12/01/:48:49)

³¹Cleveland, W., op. cit., at p. 507

³²“Israeli troops, Palestinians clash after Sharon visits Jerusalem sacred site” CNN (available online at: http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/meast/09/28/jerusalem.violence.02/ last accessed: 12/01/:46:42): as demonstrated by the ability Likud to exploit 1998 agreements and, hostility to the peace process as a whole to their own electoral ends, and of Hamas and various organizations within the umbrella of the PLO, to launch a second intifadia.

³³Horowitz, D., Ethnic Groups in Conflict (California: University of California Press, 1985).

A bit of theory...

2007-05-27T15:14:00.001+01:00

So, why am I going?

Two main reasons, to learn Arabic and to do some research for my dissertation. I plan on using this blog to make a record of my experience of Birzeit and of the West Bank and Israel.

So, what's my perspective?

The conflict between Palestine and Israel is one of the most emotive topics in contemporary affairs. I think therefore its best to outline my own perspective on the conflict right now in order to make it clear where I'll be coming from politically when I post on this blog.

1. I don't know enough about this issue to assume the right to be an authority. I'm a British student who, until I arrive, will have learned everything I know about Palestine and Israel via the media, text books, teaching or through conversations with people with more experience than me. I'm only going for two months and even if I was to live in the West Bank for the rest of my life I doubt I could ever truly understand what it is like to be a Palestinian or an Israeli. The first thing I want to say at all in the form of a substantive blog is a qualification for all my later posts. Whatever I say here, and however declarative I appear to be, it is my honest hope that I will maintain a critical outlook, that begins with skepticism toward what I appear to know most definitely.

2. With this in mind, I should also explain that my research isn't a balanced analysis of the conflict. In fact, my question doesn't really begin in politics. I hope that it is more a philosophical inquiry, albeit administered fairly practically. My interest is in identifying the motivations for why Palestinian Children get involved in the conflict.

3. Almost as I wrote that I could feel myself leaping to a number of immediate conclusions, perhaps you did too? Did the any of the following terms spring to mind?: 'suicide bombers', 'martyrs', 'religious extremism', 'terrorism' etc. etc. -- well, of course they did! This is the image thats painted of Palestine in the media all the time, particularly in recent years. While I'm not arguing that these are not factors (they must be or else we wouldn't hear of them through the media at all) I want to make the point that these are not the whole story. The prevalence of such extreme measures as suicide bombings are relatively rare in contrast to the less high profile violence that occurs daily and is, by all accounts, an intrinsic part of the Palestinian identity. So, I should make it clear then that this isn't a tabloid expose of blah blah... I'm not really interested in looking at 'extreme measures' as a phenomenon in that respect. What interests me is the less specific more generalized acts of violence by young people in the population at large.

Who's side am I on?

Well - there is no way of getting round this question... even if I go to great pains to assert my impartiality frankly its not going to wash. So what I will say is this: I've been pondering the idea for some time now that human comprehension of the external world is always somewhat flawed. In a sence it has to be, we could not appreciate the sheer data we are exposed to without some element of simplification (perhaps Kantesc 'categorization') what this tends to mean in terms of conflict, however, is that we often make unfair assumptions regarding the nature of what we are looking at. I know I do this. I think what I do is look for the key elements and relationships that I understand the meaning of and apply them to the complex data in front of us. This creates a narrative, or a story, that a) conforms to basic structure we are familiar with, b) defines the protagonists and antagonists as the particular roles we can understand, and c) helps us fill in gaps in our knowledge with further assumptions.

The effect of this is the narrative, or the story, of the conflict. With this structure as means we can take the complex data of any given situation and 'understand' what we see much more simply. There are antagonists and protagonists and there is usually a beginning, middle and in the future some 'end' that we all look towards. This narrative, of course, changes in all these respects according to whomever is telling it, and according to whomever is perceiving it.

The Israeli-Palestinian narrative is often simplified in the respect of we comprehend it as two sides: Israel vs. Palestinians, or if we have a slightly more complex understanding of the conflict, we will understand it maybe in terms of a combination of the following Likud/Kadimir/Labor vs. Hamas/Al-Fatah/Islamic Jihad etc.etc. but even here we run into problems. Even if i was to try and express a preference for any one of these factions, as a 'side' (I might declare: Al-Fatah or The Labor party have the right attitude) my preference would only be fully comprehensible within my own narrative.

So what is the solution to this? Well, there isn't one. I have to provide a context or else my research will make no sence. However, as soon as I do, I will portray the data inaccurately. I can help matters tho. The context I am hoping to provide is for a question that is basically non-political.
I'm not at all interested in arguing that any action is 'Just', what I am interested in is 'how is it justified?' in a sence I'm shrugging off Kant at this point. I don't want to discuss these issues in the shadow of an objective right and wrong, I want to talk about them in terms of cause and effect. Even if we understand that humans have the capacity for free will (although I'm not a big fan of this idea, but thats another story) we know from experience that when we act we can often point to why it is we acted in that particular way, not discounting that in any case our actions maybe based on flawed reasoning, they always seem to be based on some kind of reasoning. My project is simply to identify that reasoning and write it down.