Palestine, Israel and Pan-Arabic identiy

Again, this is taken from an essay, I don't really expect many people to read these posts, however, I want to put them here as an effort to show that my research is entirely performed 'in good faith' with full disclosure - these are the my interpretations of the facts the research I've done so far.

The Roots of Pan-Arabism

The decade of the 1940s was a period of profound change in the Middle East. The creation of Israel, the flight and homelessness of several hundred thousand Palestinians, the formation of the Arab league, the achievement of independence by the core Arab states, and the decline of Britain and France and the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as world powers clearly represented new and significant developments for the region. 1

In order to give the most informative exegesis of the history of pan-Arabism the following discussion adopts a segmented approach. The object of the narratives is to present as much factual information as is relevant and allow for appropriate analysis in the following sections. Subsection one, uses the Israeli-Palestinian issue as an exemplar of the inconstancy of a purely pan-Arabic doctrine. This subsection tracks the plight of Palestinian Arabs in particular, over the chronological period from rise of Zionism and the first waves of major Jewish immigration (c.1890s-1920s) prior to Israel’s inception, to September of 1970. It is followed by a brief theoretical account that exposes the thematic currents flowing through it. Subsection two covers and compares the formation of the failed United Arab Republic with other, more successful, intra-regional partnerships. Each of these subsections mark instances of the rise to prominence of modern pan-Arabism and its causes for its decline.

Arab Nationalism in relation to Zionism, c.1900s-1948.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century waves of Jewish immigration into mandated Palestine had become a serious issue. From the beginning “the Arabs of Palestine recognised that the goals of Zionism represented a threat to their existence.2 When their negotiations with the British governing body failed to lead to the instigation of immigration restrictions, the situation descended into violent rebellion. Between 1933 and 1936 a mass influx of refugees from Europe doubled the size of the Jewish population and adding to the anxiety of the Arab community.3

On the 14^th May 1948 Israel became independent of the British Empire and a new legal state recognised by the United Nations and the greater international community. The following day Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan and Iraq invaded that territory under the auspices of the Arab League. The war lasted until December and ended in a devastating defeat for the combined Arabic armies.4 The war followed the failure of a United Nation’s proposed compromise on the future of mandated Palestinian territory and directly led to a more-than doubling of the size of the Palestinian refugee population existing in neighbouring states. Israel’s response was to consolidate territory outside the original borders and to build a defensive military force that could secure the nation’s existence against any further threats. The Arab invasion was characterised by two major factors. The force was vastly outnumbered, under-prepared, and disorganised in comparison to their enemy, and importantly, the combined command structure was “hampered by inter-Arab political rivalries. 5 Defeat was also an acute embarrassment for those in power, particularly in the ‘core Arabic states’ of Egypt, Syria and Iraq who had promised that they “stood ready to defend them [the Palestinians] militarily.6

In 1948, the recession of Europe’s imperial influence followed by the Arabic military failure meant a radically new political landscape for the region was instantiated. Israel as an established state, posed a different challenge to Arabic states than had the European empires. Where, primarily the British, had been concerned with governing as a means to extraction of wealth, it had been in their interest to maintain stability. Consequently colonialists had no interest in undermining the existing regimes where they remained acquiescent to their aims. The new country was however a potential direct threat to the territory, culture and especially the newly found political freedom and aspirations of the ruling Arab elites. To the populations with Israel’s bordering nations, the 700,000 displaced Palestinians, demonstrated the ruthlessness of the annexation. The vast refugee camps provided a vivid exhibition of what could possibly be their own fate should Israel seek expansion. 7

Structuralism – a thematic analysis

According to the structuralist approach to conflict theory the Arab-Israeli war would have occurred against the backdrop of “cultural violence.8 For Galtung and other structural theorists, violent conflict becomes manifest due to the presence of structural inequalities between the two sides, which is ‘justified’ to the antagonists themselves, and to outside interest parties, by the instigation of ‘cultural violence’. In essence ‘cultural violence’ is the aspect of conflict where identity is at issue rather than any physical material issues. Galtung’s concept of cultural violence is cyclical in nature. Due to the instigation of direct and structural violence, cultural identity becomes more prominent in the mindset of those under oppression. As cultural identity increases in prominence it develops as the justification for retaliation for the underdog, and for continued alienation of the two parties per se. 9

C.R. Mitchell’s The Structure of International Conflict continues the discussion of the psychology of conflict, explaining that at an individual’s identification with a group dynamic or cultural identity is a necessary means by which the individual may alleviate potentially harmful levels of mental stress. “There is considerable evidence that images, attitudes, prejudices, emotions and beliefs can be relatively homogenous across a great number of individuals”.10 The inception of Israel as a potential threat to the newly found freedom of the Arab world fits into this theoretical approach. Israel had penetrated the regional order and acceded to a position of structural domination with the assistance of the United Nations and the retreating British Empire. Israel then dominated its opponents via direct violence in the 1948, and subjugated the existing Arabic population. The resultant peak in pan-Arabic hegemony was therefore, in structural terms, only to be expected.11

Collapse of anti-Israel, pro-Palestine, hegemony: June 1967 – September 1970.

The Palestinian issue continued to be a major cause for the propagation of homogeneous Arab identity until tension developed into conflict again in 1967. The joint military endeavour of the ‘June war’ again ended in disaster for the coalition of Arab states. The Palestinian refugee crisis was compounded and further territory, including Jerusalem, was lost, as show in the following maps. 12

Israel’s military success was followed by another attempt by the United Nations to find peace and territorial compromise. While the resolution emphasized the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war".13& 14 The resolution made did make a major and if not immediate impact on the context of the region. After a failed attempt in, 1973 by Egypt and Syria to take back the Sinai, and the Golan Heights, Egypt signed UNSCR 338, which re-iterated 242. It was a separate peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, and thus the Palestinians lost their most powerful ally. and called for an Israeli withdrawal, it provided for no material means of enforcement for such requests. It failed to recognise potential Palestinian sovereignty and referred only to “achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem”. Jordan also accepted an uneasy peace, leaving Syria as the only belligerent government. “The June war was a turning point, and although the notion of an Arab nation retained a grip on the Arab imagination …secular nationalism as a culture and model of modernization was …a failure in the Middle East".15

For the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) the irrelevance of the United Nations (UN) as a proponent of a fair solution was palpably confirmed by UNSCR 242. Egypt and Jordan’s acceptance of the resolution was, however, a much more serious blow to the Palestinian cause. It demonstrated the scale of the cleavage within pan-Arabism that had been on the rise since the 1950’s. The Palestinian response was to move to a more radical and nationalist approach. In 1969 Yasir Arafat, the leader of al Fatah movement, was elected to the chairmanship of the PLO. This signalled a major change in the nature of the organisation which had been formed in 1964 under the behest of the Arab League. It had been lead thus far by predominantly intellectual elite, and framed within various political ideologies such as Marxism, Baathism and pan-Arabism.16 Al Fatah offered an alternative, they endorsed Palestinian resistance to Israel, including by violent means, as a primary political goal, free from qualification from broader political philosophies. 17 It was “an appealing and readily comprehensible message to a broad cross-section of Palestinian". 18

Where al Fatah led on the political front, other factions within the PLO followed militarily. In 1970 acting virtually autonomously, but in the name of the PLO, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) launched a guerrilla war from within Jordanian territory. By September of that year the PFLP had effectively formed a “state-within-a-state”19&20 From the 15^th-25^{th. 21}Civilians and paramilitaries alike were killed, not by the hand of Zionists, but by Arabic soldiers, under the orders of an Arabic king. ‘Black September’ fundamentally undermined the primacy of pan-Arabic unity. The PLO was forced to re-locate to Lebanon, and the guerrilla war became terrorism, indeed a threat to individual Israelis, but no longer a danger to the future of the state. and thus formed a serious threat the authority of King Husayn. of September the Jordanian Army ruthlessly, and indiscriminately, re-imposed the King’s power over the area’s controlled by the PFLP. At the end of the ten days, 3,000 Palestinians lay dead.

Intra-Arab politics and Pan-Arabism (with reference to applicable extra-regional factors).

In the previous subsection we discussed the rise and descent of pan-Arabism in relation to an opposing, and threatening, form of identity. In this subsection we will unearth the instances that demonstrate the complexities of pan-Arabic identity from within. The best way to begin this analysis is to briefly note the phenomena of Arabic supra-state institutions. Of the 11 major supranational institutions/treaty organisations that have existed since 1945, 22 only the Arab League is both entirely and exclusively Arabic, and still survives.23 Out of the others that have developed over that period of time, and have remained in existence, we can see a common respect for the sovereignty which contradicts the most ambitions elements of the political ideology of pan-Arabic integration. For an explanation of this apparent paradox we must no longer limit our perspective to looking at the states through the prism of ideological discourse, but also appreciate the ideology itself from the perspective of national governments.

Theoretical conclusions

As the example demonstrates, identity in the Middle Eastern states is a constant and yet fluid concept. It is not powerful enough on its own to create lasting homogeny in absence of core material interdependencies. However, in times of crisis, the appeal of unification can develop into a cycle of self-referential justifications. Group identity of any form, is fundamentally a practically necessary proxy of personal identity. The existence of a threat to one’s group is a threat to one’s own existence. It causes an increase in an individual’s focus on what is apparently familiar, and thus self-preserving, in contrast to what is unfamiliar. Such a focus extenuates the perceived differences and makes the disparity more pronounced, and thus increases the perceived danger of the threat. Living with such a cycle is, however, an extremely stressful and exhausting condition, and as a result one cannot maintain it as a primary thought process indefinitely.24

When attention diverges from the threat, one’s concern will be other aspects of life critical to existence. The state of the economy, living conditions and political access for example are all material issues that will also be high priorities. It is my argument that, the individual, whether a member of the ruling elite, or a member of the populace, will react to any given perceived threat against existence by seeking solidarity with those they are most familiar with. However, when that threat has passed or, become less pressing, the reality of issues such as poverty or political irrelevance, return to their positions of high priority issues. As we have seen through the concept of omnibalancing, above, this analysis is as applicable to the mindset of national governments as much as it is to the individual person, and it is particularly applicable to Middle Eastern states due to the problematic of post-colonial legitimacy.

The central pursuit of most MENA [Middle East and North African] regimes remains that of domestic survival – and the search for legitimacy, acquiescence and control to assure this, in turn supported by a sear for recourses to deploy in this domestic quest. The root of these dynamics remains in the inadequate ‘stateness’ of many of the countries in question, combined with a failure to ‘perform’ either politically or economically. 25

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W.Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Oxford: Westview Press, 2004), p. 270.

Ibid.: p.254.

Ibid.: p.254.

J. Bill and R. Springborg, Politics in the Middle East (Harlow: Longman, 2000), p. 243.

W. Cleveland, op. cit., p.267.

Ibid.: p.266.

Cf. W.Cleveland, op. cit., pp. 243-266.: Also N.B. J. Bill and R. Springborg, op. cit., p. 231.:The massacre of 250 civilians at Dayr Yassin.

J. Galtung. “Cultural Violence” Journal of Peace Research (Vol. 27, No. 3. aug., 1990), pp. 291-305.

J. Galtung. Peace by Peaceful means: Peace and Conflict Development and Civilization (London: SAGE Publications, 1996).

C. Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict, (London, Macmillan Press, 1981). p. 71.

J. Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means, op. cit.

Source of images is http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/v3_israel_palestinians/maps/html/six_day_war.stm (last accessed: 03/01/2007 14:59:15)

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/94/IMG/NR.pdf?OpenElement, last accessed 14/01/:46:30)

UNSCR 242, op. cit.,

S. Murden, Islam, the Middle East, and the new Global Hegemony (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). p.463.

W.Cleveland, op. cit., p. 358.: More detail on the nature and growth of the PLO where relevant to the argument is included below. However, a fuller description of the organisations beginnings can be found: Cf. W.Cleveland, op. cit. pp 345-373.: A. Mosely Lesch “The Palestinians” in D. Long and B. Reich (eds.), The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa (Oxford: Westveiw Press, 1980), pp. 285-301.

Al-Fatah Constitution: http://www.fateh.net/e_public/constitution.htm (last accessed: 08/01/:50:50).

W.Cleveland, op. cit., p. 359.

Lesch, op. cit., p. 286.

The English spellings of translated proper nouns vary according to which source one refers too. For the sake of consistency, aside from in direct quotations, I have chosen to adopt the spellings in W.Cleveland, op. cit.

W.Cleveland, op. cit. p.363.

L. Fawcett, “Aliancess, Cooperation and Regionalism in the Middle East” in Fawcett (ed.) International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 173-194.,at p. 185. Also Cf. Appendix.

The Arab League”, Microsoft® Encarta® 2007 [DVD]. Microsoft Corporation, 2006.: The Arab League was formed in 1945 based on three major premises: one, the prevention of a Jewish state. The second was independence of all Arab peoples. Third, closer co-operation and yet respect for national sovereignty. Although the league has been involved in various major regional peacekeeping and military actions (Lebanese civil wars of 1958 and , along with the combined assaults on Israel detailed above) its role in recent years has been largely focused on economic, cultural and developmental policies.

C. Mitchell, op. cit.

G. Nonneman, “The Three Environments of Middle East Foreign Policy Making and Relations with Europe” in G. Nonneman (ed.) Analyzing Middle East Forign Policies: and The Relationship with Europe (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 19-42 at p.19: